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I. On Philosophical Education
1 To many philosophical sensibilities the expression “Pragmatic Naturalism” may sound
like a sort of oxymoron. We have a good news: it is not. John Ryder’s new book The
Things on Heaven and Earth will not persuade perhaps the most reluctant partisans of
both  sides,  but  it  certainly  shows how “pragmatic  naturalism” is  not  necessarily  a
contradictio in adjecto,  but rather an exciting theoretical approach. After reading this
book, one acquires the confidence that pragmatic naturalism can be a valuable tool to
deal  satisfactorily  with  a  good  number  of  issues  debated  in  virtually  all  fields  of
contemporary philosophy. This remarkable defense of pragmatic naturalism is also an
instance  of  the  best  pragmatic  legacy  in  terms  of  methodological  fluidity  and
theoretical openness while using a convincing and clear style of argumentation.
2 Ryder’s  approach  to  pragmatic  naturalism  is  not  an  unspecified  appeal  to
methodological  plurality.  On  the  contrary,  he  shows  that  different  disciplinary
approaches to any subject-matter produce “virtuous circularities.” According to Ryder,
these  circularities  have  the  merit  of  allowing  for  a  sound  critique  of  many  of  the
habitual, academic prejudices. Many times these academic prejudices unnaturally force
students to choose between apparently opposing teams. This book should be received
as a healthy invitation to cultivate a different attitude. Ryder successfully demonstrates
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how an encompassing approach can be well structured, clear and productive at once. In
sum, this book should be carefully read in many introductory philosophy courses.
3 However,  The  Things  on  Heaven  and  Earth also  has  further  merits.  John  Ryder  is
determined to demonstrate the plausibility and usefulness of combining pragmatism
and naturalism. Despite the book deals with a considerable number of topics, its very
precise structure covers a wide range of interests in an accessible and effective way.
4 In Part I,  Ryder articulates the fundamental tenets of his proposal,  as he provides a
general framework to stress the contrasts and connections between the naturalist and
the pragmatist perspective, along with a clear elucidation of the current debates on
this issue.  Part II  develops  the  ontological  and  epistemological  consequences  of
pragmatic  naturalism,  dealing  with  different  areas  of  experience  such  as  scientific
research, religious views, and artistic practices. Finally, Part III accounts for the social
and political relevance of his proposal. In particular, Ryder focuses his attention on the
problems of contemporary democracies and international relations, while showing in
what way pragmatic naturalism can be a helpful instrument to inform contemporary
cosmopolitism.
5 The purpose that pervades this work is outspoken by the initial quote, the moment
when Hamlet admonishes Horatio’s “epistemic dogmatism:” “There are more things on
heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” The question will
be to decide whether the genuine “naturalist” is Horatio or Hamlet. Following the lines
of  the  traditional  pragmatist  attempt  to  elucidate  practical  contexts  of  knowledge,
Ryder rightly affirms that the ultimate philosophical endeavor is to address the actual
complexity of human experience. To pay due account to all the “things on heaven and
earth” means here to study those regions of  experience neglected during the 20th 
century,  as  the  result  of  a  reductive  materialist  interpretation  of  the  concept  of
“nature.” Although Ryder does not refer explicitly to a phenomenological conception of
“nature,”  it  is  worth  mentioning  how his  themes  and perspectives  keep a  familiar
resemblance  with  both  Husserl’s  research  on  “regional  ontologies”  and  with  the
phenomenological  dispute  on  reduced  conceptions  of  naturalism.1 In  any  case,
pragmatic naturalism is intended to fill the void left by artificial, clear-cut divisions of
experience as sketched in radical materialist interpretations of experience and nature.
6 Notwithstanding its high scope and its breadth of interests, The Things on Heaven and
Earth does not fall into a flabby pluralism but provides a solid outlook where “the point
is  not  to  talk  about  everything but  to  articulate  a  philosophic  perspective  through
which  it  is  possible  to  make  sense  of  whatever  experience  and  thought  reveal  or
generate,  however  they  reveal  or  generate  it”  (9).  With  this  aim  in  view,  Ryder
consistently claims for a rebuttal  of  two common epistemological  assumptions with
regard to metaphysical issues. In the first place, he affirms that conceptualizing the
“existence” problem in terms of deciding that ‘this’ or ‘that’ “exists” is unnecessarily
reductive and insufficient to cope with the complexity of human experiences. Secondly,
Ryder suggests that the ambition of making a sort of “reality list” in a Quinean style
eventually  entails  more  epistemological  problems  than  it  solves.  Thus,  the  book
proposes a totally different task for epistemology, i.e. the exploration of the variety of
conditions under which our very frames of understanding are constructed.
7 Therefore,  Ryder’s  approach  is  not  to  regard  metaphysical  issues  as  misleading
philosophical problems and, consequently, to discard them. On the contrary, problems
that stem from these metaphysical issues should be confronted through an extensive
John Ryder, The Things on Heaven and Earth
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-1 | 2014
2
understanding  of  epistemology,  specifically  connected  to  ontological  inquiry.  This
would allow for a satisfactory elucidation of the meaning of existential propositions:
“The metaphysical – or, better, the ontological – question is not whether this or that
exists but rather how we might understand whatever it is what exist” (1). In this sense,
a distinctive trait of pragmatic naturalism would be a certain “ontological tolerance”
towards  the  vast  domain  of  the  real  that  would  make  possible  to  identify  a  good
number of candidates as suitable “sources of knowledge,” in contrast to the prejudicial
attitudes  displayed  by  other  understandings  of  ontology.  However,  Ryder  rightly
specifies that his ontological tolerance does not equate to a rejection of naturalism. The
challenge is to construct a solid bridge between pragmatism and naturalism that can
provide a more encompassing approach to the varieties of human experience.
 
II. A Pragmatic Naturalist Point of View
8 This book undertakes a reconciliation of pragmatism and naturalism on the basis of
their  respective  accounts  of  the  concepts  of  “experience”  and  “nature.”  As  Ryder
observes, “in a nutshell, for pragmatism nature is understood in terms of experience,
and for naturalism experience is understood in terms of nature” (22). In order to prove
how  both  views  can  come  together,  Ryder  settles  a  preliminary  framework  for
pragmatic  naturalism  by  clarifying  three  main  tenets.  First,  he  explains  how  the
conceptual struggle between objectivism and constructivism can be avoided through
the recognition that both perspectives can be justified without the need of a mutual
exclusion. Interestingly, Ryder relocates this debate along the lines of the split between
modernism and postmodernism. Ryder’s account of this debate is summarized in four
plain  and  precise  propositions:  1)  Natural  Phenomena  have  objective,  determinate
traits; 2) the traits of natural phenomena are knowable; 3) the process of inquiry is
necessarily conditioned and perspectival;  and 4) human interaction with the rest of
nature, cognitive or otherwise, is active and creative. According to Ryder, points 1 and
2  would  define  the  modern  perspective  while  points  3  and  4  correspond  to  the
postmodern view. In order to connect these contending positions, the author exposes a
painstaking  and  convincing  argumentation  on  how  the  four  propositions  are
simultaneously true, which is possible when we endorse a relational perspective on
nature.
9 Second, Ryder reinterprets Dewey’s relational ontology by complementing it with the
ordinal  naturalism  of  Justus  Buchler.  This  combination  is  found  at  its  best  in  the
theoretical  work of  the  so-called Columbia  School.  The recovery of  this  pragmatist
legacy is one of the most appealing achievements of the book. The author suggests that
the  original,  naturalist  trait  of  pragmatism  can  be  re-appropriated  in  order  to
overcome the prevalence of Rortyan extreme relativism and rejection of objectivism.2
The basic ontological idea underlying this stress on relationality is that “all ‘things’ are
constituted by constituents and their relations, and that no constituent is atomic” (41).
In  other  words,  nature  as  we  experience  it is  not  divided  into  simple  pieces  of
information or empiria in the materialist sense; on the contrary, nature is absolutely
relational. Interestingly, Ryder remarks that absolute relationality does not mean to
assume the necessity of an Absolute since this would be to claim for non-relational
entities.  For this reason, even though relational ontology of “constitutive relations”
opposes to reductive materialism, it needs not to be a form of idealism either.
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10 Third, we find that pragmatic naturalism constitutes a rebuttal of the hegemony of
deductive argumentation in contemporary philosophy. Mathematical language is just
but one form of reasonable activity among others. If pragmatic naturalism possesses its
own specificity in relation to pragmatism, then there is no point in prescribing only
one mode of valid argumentation: “Nature is complex, and there is no good reason to
insist that any one way at it has a monopoly on access” (8).
11 The reader is led to see the remarkable and coherent versatility of this perspective, in
relation  to  a  considerable  variety  of  philosophical  subjects,  through  the  defining
features of pragmatic naturalism as stated by Ryder. In short, the analytic potential of
pragmatic naturalism can be described in the following way: “pragmatic naturalism is a
relational philosophy; it is a philosophy for which nature is a category sufficient for all
things; it holds that nature consists of more than material objects; it  proceeds as if
natural  science  is  one  of  several  sources  of  knowledge;  and  it  is  a  philosophical
perspective that expects to be evaluated by its usefulness and value in philosophical
and other contexts” (43).
 
III. The Practical Value of Philosophy
12 The  third  part  of  The  Things  on  Heaven  and  Earth focuses  on  the  practical  value  of
philosophy. If  the value of ideas is  to be found in the function they accomplish,  as
Ryder  affirms,  they can be  therefore  evaluated in  light  of  how many philosophical
deadlocks they help to avoid and in the number of regions of experience that they help
to  elucidate.  The  list  of  virtues  of  pragmatic  naturalism  singled  out  by  Ryder
simultaneously represents a declaration of purposes and an assortment of criteria for
judging the success of his proposal as a whole. First, pragmatic naturalism rejects to
support  philosophical  dualisms  –  mind  and  body,  self  and  world,  objectivity  and
subjectivity,  etc.  –  in  a  way  that  each one  becomes  a  problem for  the  other.  Each
counterpart makes a compelling claim that calls our attention, so it is artificial and
unfruitful to tear apart in clashing theoretical pieces a world that is in fact coherently
experienced.
13 Second, pragmatic naturalism can be considered as the contemporary expression of a
tradition  that  stays  away  from  reductionism  in  the  above  mentioned  sense.  The
pragmatic naturalist perspective allows us to accept the multiplicity of nature without
dissolving some of its features. The relational understanding allows us to recognize and
to acknowledge the diversity in nature while at the same time accounting for specific
relations existing among constituents of this diversity.
14 Third,  pragmatic  naturalism  permits  to  recover  the  dimension  of  objectivity  in
experience,  which  has  been  greatly  neglected  in  the  postmodern  trends  of
contemporary pragmatism. This move makes it possible to connect perspectivism and
objectivity  in  a  satisfactory  way.  As  Ryder  points  out,  the  absence  of  absolute
knowledge  does  not  preclude  objectivity,  either  epistemological  or  ontological.
Perspectival epistemology and objectivist ontology are not mutually exclusive.
15 A fourth virtue, Ryder affirms, shows how a non-dogmatic interpretation of the idea of
“nature” permits to regard multiple dimensions of our experience (art, music, poetry,
etc.) as cognitively significant activities. None of these insights are produced by science
but they constitute judgments that make available to us important traits of the world.
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16 The fifth contribution of pragmatic naturalism rests on its capability to neutralize the
“logical” shift of much of historical and contemporary philosophy. Deductive reasoning
is  not  the  only  valid  form of  evaluating  an idea  or  proposition.  Though pragmatic
naturalism is not antifoundationalism, it does not pretend to provide the world with
unshakable foundations.
17 Finally,  pragmatic  naturalism  constitutes  a  good  resource  to  deactivate  dogmatic
positions in the social-political  realm. A “pragmatic ethos,”3 which is  essentially an
assortment  of  practices  and  attitudes  like  experimentalism,  self-correction,  and
fallibilism, can be productively interpreted along democratic lines. After reading the
last part of the book, one gets the vivid impression that pragmatic naturalism really
opens the path for  an interesting set  of  political  applications,  in  line with Dewey’s
perspective  on  democracy  as  an  intelligent  and  creative  activity.  A  wise  use  of
indeterminacy and fluidity,  as depicted by Ryder,  allows the cultivation of common
interests between individuals and communities with different backgrounds, which is an
appropriate challenge to the current state of affairs of global international relations.
18 In  sum,  the  contemporary  increasing  interest4 in  pragmatic  naturalism  and  the
acuteness of the arguments exposed by Ryder reveal The Things on Heaven and Earth
as a  timely and constructive contribution to the field.  However,  not  only academic
debates or scholarly contentions are addressed here. The book also exhibits a fruitful
effort to connect philosophy and life. Ryder’s pursuit of commonalities is perhaps one
of the most attractive points of the book, insofar as it is symptomatic of an ethical shift
that pervades our current societies. The need for neutralizing the adverse effects of
centuries of individualism is paving the way for a reappraisal of the meaning we give to
the  fact  (and  challenges)  of  living  together.  Philosophy  can  provide  valuable
instruments of rationality for these new horizons and this book is a good proof of it.
NOTES
1. See Husserl E., (1952), Ideen I, Hua. IV, Den Haag, ed. Marly Biemel, § 149, and Rosenthal S. B.,
Bourgeois P. L., (1980), Pragmatism and Phenomenology, Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing.
2. Along the same lines, see Bernstein R., (1983), Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, Philadelphia,
University of Pennsylvania Press.
3. For the idea of a “Pragmatic Ethos” see Bernstein R., (1991), The New Constellation: The Ethical-
Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity, New York, Polity Press, p. 324.
4. See Shook J., (2003), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism, Armherst, N.Y, Prometheus Books.
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